Citizen Franklin On U.S. Domestic and Foreign Surveillance: What's at Steak?
As Congress debates the issues of domestic and foreign surveillance by the U.S. government my concern as a U.S. citizen grows. I don't dispute that our spy agencies need the ability to snoop on phone conversations in appropriate circumstances to protect the safety of the American people. My issue is with the oversight of the programs.
Let's start with some basic assumptions that few would dispute:
1. Somewhere, in buildings or offices unknown to us, there exists apparatus that allows our spy agencies to intercept and monitor phone and computer communications around the U.S. and over much of the world.
2. A small but significant number of employees of the Executive branch of the U.S. government have access to that apparatus and the records it generates.
3. The potential for abuse of that information for political and economic gain are mind-boggling in scope.
As an example to number 3, consider the value of monitoring phone conversations of political rivals. You would know every move that your opponent was going to make in time to counter and defeat it. As Watergate taught us, the temptation on politicians to obtain such information cannot always be resisted. I would equate it to putting a well trained but hungry dog in a room alone with a big juicy steak. You could tell the dog to "sit" and "stay", but if you came back to that room a few hours later, would you expect the steak to still be there?
I would not accuse the current chief executive of personally using that information for political gain. However, there are many employees and subordinates whose fortunes and jobs might depend upon certain political outcomes. Might one of them be tempted to eat the steak?
Consider also the vast potential for illicit economic gain. Access to the spy apparatus and information would provide the ultimate potential for insider trading information. Might one of those federal employees be tempted to eat the steak, considering the potential rewards?
It would be easier not to be concerned if the Executive branch had a sterling record of effective oversight of its employees and records. Unfortunately, Abu Ghraib and many other incidents suggest otherwise. The greatest possible independent oversight should be required for access and use of information obtained through the spy program. Limited warrant requirements and occasional reports to select congresspersons are laughable and would not prevent any of the abuses mentioned above. If only loyal members of the Executive branch and currently ruling party have access to the information, and that access is not very closely and independently supervised, then we are back to the problem of the dog in the room with the steak. Much, much more oversight is needed when considering such vast access to telephone and computer message traffic.
Let's start with some basic assumptions that few would dispute:
1. Somewhere, in buildings or offices unknown to us, there exists apparatus that allows our spy agencies to intercept and monitor phone and computer communications around the U.S. and over much of the world.
2. A small but significant number of employees of the Executive branch of the U.S. government have access to that apparatus and the records it generates.
3. The potential for abuse of that information for political and economic gain are mind-boggling in scope.
As an example to number 3, consider the value of monitoring phone conversations of political rivals. You would know every move that your opponent was going to make in time to counter and defeat it. As Watergate taught us, the temptation on politicians to obtain such information cannot always be resisted. I would equate it to putting a well trained but hungry dog in a room alone with a big juicy steak. You could tell the dog to "sit" and "stay", but if you came back to that room a few hours later, would you expect the steak to still be there?
I would not accuse the current chief executive of personally using that information for political gain. However, there are many employees and subordinates whose fortunes and jobs might depend upon certain political outcomes. Might one of them be tempted to eat the steak?
Consider also the vast potential for illicit economic gain. Access to the spy apparatus and information would provide the ultimate potential for insider trading information. Might one of those federal employees be tempted to eat the steak, considering the potential rewards?
It would be easier not to be concerned if the Executive branch had a sterling record of effective oversight of its employees and records. Unfortunately, Abu Ghraib and many other incidents suggest otherwise. The greatest possible independent oversight should be required for access and use of information obtained through the spy program. Limited warrant requirements and occasional reports to select congresspersons are laughable and would not prevent any of the abuses mentioned above. If only loyal members of the Executive branch and currently ruling party have access to the information, and that access is not very closely and independently supervised, then we are back to the problem of the dog in the room with the steak. Much, much more oversight is needed when considering such vast access to telephone and computer message traffic.